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Abstract – In cooperative stochastic dynamic games a stringent condition - subgame consistency – is required for a dynamically stable solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behavior would remain optimal. The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoff structures in stochastic games. This paper considers subgame consistent solutions for cooperative stochastic games with randomly furcating payoff structures. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This is the first time that subgame consistent solution for randomly-furcating stochastic games is obtained. It widens the application of cooperative dynamic game theory to discrete-time problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty.  
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The discipline of game theory studies decision making in an interactive environment.  One particularly complex and fruitful branch of game theory is dynamic games, which investigate interactive decision making over time. A property of decision making over time is that the future is inherently unknown and therefore (in the mathematical sense) uncertain. Yeung (2001 and 2003) introduces the class of randomly furcating stochastic differential games which allows stochastic dynamics and random changes in future payoff structures. This extension allows random elements in future payoffs which are prevalent in many practical situations like regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental management.
Cooperative games suggest the possibility of socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic action. In dynamic cooperative games with stochastic elements, a stringent condition – that of subgame consistency -- is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution.  In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame-consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behavior would remain optimal.  In particular the property of subgame consistency ensures that as the game proceeds  players are guided by the same optimality principle at each instant of time, and hence do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior throughout the game. A rigorous framework for the study of subgame-consistent solutions in cooperative stochastic differential games was established in the work of Yeung and Petrosyan (2004, 2005 and 2006). A generalized theorem was developed for the derivation of an analytically tractable “payoff distribution procedure” which would lead to subgame-consistent solutions. Petrosyan and Yeung (2007) derived subgame consistent solutions for randomly furcating continuous-time stochastic differential games.
In computer modeling and operations research study discrete-time analysis often proved to be more applicable and compatible with actual data. In stochastic dynamic games, Basar and Mintz (1972 and 1973) and Basar (1978) developed equilibrium solution of linear-quadratic stochastic dynamic games with noisy observation. Basar and Ho (1974) and Basar (1979) examined informational properties of the Nash solutions of stochastic nonzero-sum games. Some applications of stochastic dynamic games can be found in Smith and Zenou (2003) and Esteban-Bravo and Nogales (2008). Yeung and Petrosyan (2010) derived subgame consistent solutions for cooperative stochastic dynamic games. 
This paper develops the class of randomly furcating discrete-time stochastic games. The Nash equilibrium is characterized for non-cooperative outcomes and subgame-consistent cooperative solutions is derived for the cooperative paradigm. A discrete-time analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This is the first time that subgame consistent solutions of randomly-furcating cooperative stochastic dynamic games are examined. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to discrete-time problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. The paper is organized as follows. The game formulation is given in Section 2. Group optimality and individual rationality under dynamic cooperation are discussed in section 3. Subgame consistent solutions and payment mechanism leading to the realization of these solutions are obtained in Section 4. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 

2.  Game Formulation and Outcome
Consider the stage person nonzero-sum discrete-time dynamic game with initial state . The state space of the game is  and the state dynamics of the game is characterized by the stochastic difference equation:
	,					(2.1)
for  and ,	
where  is the control vector of player  at stage ,  is the state, and  is a sequence of statistically independent random variables. 
	The payoff of player  at stage  is  which is affected by a random variable . In particular,  for  are independent random variables with range  and corresponding probabilities . In stage 1, it is known that  equals  with probability .
	The objective that player  seeks to maximize is
, 
   for ,	                                                               	 (2.2)
where  is the expectation operation with respect to the random variables ,, and , and  is a terminal payment given at stage . The payoffs of the players are transferable. 
	The game (2.1)-(2.2) is a randomly furcating stochastic dynamic game. In a stochastic dynamic game framework, strategy space with state-dependent property has to be considered. In particular, a pre-specified class  of mapping  with the property , for  and  and , is the strategy space player  and each of its elements is a permissible strategy.
	To solve the game, we invoke the principle of optimality in Bellman’s (1957) technique of dynamic programming and begin with the subgame starting at last operating stages, that is stage . If   has occurred at stage  and the state  , the subgame becomes:
 , for ,
subject to
.                                     			(2.3)
	A set of state-dependent strategies , for  constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution to the subgame (2.3) if the following conditions are satisfied:
=  
	     
                               ,  for ,
where      

                            .
	A Nash equilibrium of the subgame (2.3) can be characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.   A set of strategies , for  provides a Nash equilibrium solution to the subgame (2.3) if there exist functions , for , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
   
                , 
;                               for ,    			(2.4)
where 
  . 
Proof.  The system of equations in (2.4) satisfies the standard discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming property and the Nash property for each player . Hence a Nash (1951) equilibrium of the subgame (2.3) is characterized. One can see the detailed proof of the results in Theorem 6.10 in Basar and Olsder (1999).     
	For the sake of exposition, we sidestep the issue of multiple equilibria and focus on playable games in which a particular noncooperative Nash equilibrium is chosen by the players in the subgame. Using Lemma 2.1, one can characterize the value functions  for all  if they exist. In particular,  yields player ’s expected game equilibrium payoff in the subgame starting at stage  given that  occurs and .
	Then we proceed to the subgame starting at stage  when   occurs and . In this subgame which player  seeks to maximize his expected payoff

                

              , for ,               (2.5)
subject to 
,	for  and .              (2.6)
	If the functions  for all  characterized in Lemma 2.1 exist, the subgame (2.5)-(2.6) can be expressed as a game in which player  seeks to maximize the expected payoff

	,   for ,       (2.7)
using his control .
	 A set of strategies , for  constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution to the subgame (2.7) if the following conditions are satisfied:
=       
           
     
  , for ,  (2.8)
where 
. 
	A Nash equilibrium of the subgame (2.7) can be characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2.   A set of strategies , for  provides a Nash equilibrium solution to the subgame (2.7) if there exist functions  for  and  characterized in Lemma 2.1, and functions , for , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
   
            
               ,          for .   (2.9)
where 
,
Proof.  The conditions in Lemma 2.1 and the system of equations in (2.9) satisfies the standard discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming property and the Nash property for each player . Hence a Nash equilibrium of the subgame (2.7) is characterized.     
	In particular, , if exists, yields player ’s expected game equilibrium payoff in the subgame starting at stage  given that  occurs and .
	Consider the subgame starting at stage  when  occurs and , in which player  maximizes his expected payoff

                 , for ,            (2.10)
subject to 
, for  and .            (2.11)
Following the above analysis, the subgame (2.10)-(2.11) can be expressed as  a game in which player  maximizes his expected payoff

	,  for ,              (2.12)
with his control ,
where  is player ’s expected game equilibrium payoff in the subgame starting at stage  given that  occurs and .
	A set of strategies , for  constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution to the subgame (2.12)  if the following conditions are satisfied:
=       
           
     
         , 
where 

     . 
	A Nash equilibrium solution for the game (2.1)-(2.2) can be characterized as follows.

Theorem 2.1.   A set of strategies , for ,  and  constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution to the game (2.1)-(2.2) if there exist functions , for ,  and , such that the following recursive relations are satisfied:
,          
   
                , 

     ;
for ,  and ,                          		(2.13)
where 
;
for .  
Proof.    
The results in (2.13) characterizing the game equilibrium in stage  and stage  are proved in Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2. Invoking the subgame in stage  as expressed in (2.12), the results in (2.13) satisfy the optimality conditions in stochastic dynamic programming and the Nash equilibrium property for each player in each of these subgames. Therefore, a feedback Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1)-(2.2) is characterized.      		 
	Theorem 2.1 is the discrete-time analog of the Nash equilibrium in the continuous-time randomly furcating stochastic differential games in Yeung (2001 and 2003) and Petrosyan and Yeung (2007). 
	 
3.  Dynamic Cooperation
Now consider the case when the players agree to cooperate and distribute the joint payoff among themselves according to an optimality principle. Two essential properties that a cooperative scheme has to satisfy are group optimality and individual rationality. Group optimality ensures that all potential gains from cooperation are captured. Failure to fulfill group optimality leads to the condition where the participants prefer to deviate from the agreed upon solution plan in order to extract the unexploited gains. Individual rationality is required to hold so that the payoff allocated to an economic agent under cooperation will be no less than its noncooperative payoff.  Failure to guarantee individual rationality leads to the condition where the concerned participants would reject the agreed upon solution plan and play noncooperatively. 
3.1. Group Optimality
Maximizing the players’ expected joint payoff guarantees group optimality in a game where payoffs are transferable. To maximize their expected joint payoff the players have to solve the discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming problem of maximizing  
       (3.1)
subject to (2.1).   
	The stochastic control problem (2.1)-(3.1) can be regarded as a single-player case of the game problem (2.1)-(2.2) with  and the payoff being the sum of the all the players’ payoffs.  In a stochastic dynamic framework, again strategy space with state-dependent property has to be considered. In particular, a pre-specified class  of mapping  with the property , for  and  and , is the strategy space player  and each of its elements is a permissible strategy.
	To solve the dynamic programming problem (2.1) and (3.1), we first consider the problem starting at stage . If   has occurred at stage  and the state  , the control problem becomes:
                        (3.2)
subject to
.                                     			   (3.3)
	An optimal solution to the stochastic control problem (3.2)-(3.3) can be characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1.   A set of controls , for  provides an optimal solution to the control problem (3.2)-(3.3) if there exist functions , for , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
 
           ,
.                                   				(3.4)
Proof.  The system of equations in (3.4) satisfies the standard discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming property. One can see the detailed proof of the results in Basar and Olsder (1999).                
	Using Lemma 3.1, one can characterize the functions  for all  , if they exist. In particular,  yields the expected cooperative payoff in the cooperation duration starting at stage  given that  occurs and .
	Following the analysis in Section 2, the control problem starting at stage  when  occurs and  can be expressed as:

	,            		(3.5)
where  is the expected optimal cooperative payoff in the control problem starting at stage  when  occurs and .
           An optimal solution for the stochastic control problem (2.1) and (3.1) can be characterized as follows.

Theorem 3.1.   A set of controls , for ,  and  provides an optimal solution to the stochastic control problem (2.1) and (3.1) if there exist functions , for  and , such that the following recursive relations are satisfied:
,       
 
           ,
 
           ,
for  and .                          			   (3.6)
Proof.    The results in (3.6) characterizing the optimal solution in stage  is proved in Lemma 3.1. Invoking the specification of the control problem starting in stage  as expressed in (3.5), the results in (3.6) satisfy the optimality conditions in stochastic dynamic programming. Therefore, an optimal solution of the stochastic control problem (2.1) and (3.1) is characterized.                       
	Theorem 3.1 is the discrete-time analog of the optimal cooperative scheme in randomly furcating stochastic differential games in Petrosyan and Yeung (2007). 
	Substituting the optimal control , for  and  into the state dynamics (2.1), one can obtain the dynamics of the cooperative trajectory as:
    ,    if occurs,     (3.7)
for ,  and .
	We use  to denote the set of realizable values of  at stage  generated by (3.7). The term  is used to denote an element in . 
	 The term  gives the expected total cooperative payoff over the stages from  to  if   occurs and  is realized at stage .
3.2. Individual Rationality 
The players then have to agree to an optimality principle in distributing the total cooperative payoff among themselves. For individual rationality to be upheld the expected payoffs a player receives under cooperation have to be no less than his expected noncooperative payoff along the cooperative state trajectory . For instance, (i) the players may share the excess of the total expected cooperative payoff over the expected sum of individual noncooperative payoffs equally, or (ii) they may share the total expected cooperative payoff proportional to their expected noncooperative payoffs.
	Let  denote the imputation vector guiding the distribution of the total expected cooperative payoff under the agreed-upon optimality principle along the cooperative trajectory given that  has occurred in stage , for   and . In particular, the imputation  gives the expected cumulative payments that player  will receive from stage  to stage  under cooperation.
	If for example, the optimality principle specifies that the players share the excess of the total cooperative payoff over the sum of individual noncooperative payoffs equally, then the imputation to player  becomes:
 = +,	     (3.8)
for  and .
	For individual rationality to be maintained throughout all the stages , it is required that:
 , for ,  and .     (3.9)
To satisfy group optimality, the imputation vector has to satisfy 
 = ,     for  and .      (3.10) 
	Hence, a valid imputation , for ,  and , has to satisfy conditions (3.9) and (3.10).

4. Subgame Consistent Solutions and Payment Mechanism
To guarantee dynamical stability in a stochastic dynamic cooperation scheme, the solution has to satisfy the property of subgame consistency in addition to group optimality and individual rationality.  Under a subgame-consistent cooperative solution an extension of the solution policy to any subgame starting at a later time with any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behavior would remain optimal.  In particular, subgame consistency ensures that as the game proceeds players are guided by the same optimality principle at each stage of the game, and hence do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. Therefore for subgame consistency to be satisfied, the imputation  according to the original optimality principle has to be maintained at all the  stages along the cooperative trajectory . In other words, the imputation
,             (4.1)
for  ,  and , has to be upheld.
4.1. Payoff Distribution Procedure
Following the analysis of Yeung and Petrosyan (2010), we formulate a Payoff Distribution Procedure (PDP) so that the agreed imputations (4.1) can be realized. Let  denote the payment that player  will received at stage  under the cooperative agreement if   occurs and  is realized at stage . The payment scheme  contingent upon the event  and state , for  constitutes a PDP in the sense that the imputation to player  over the stages 1 to  can be expressed as:
    +,    (4.2)
for .
                However, according to the original optimality principle in (4.1), if  occurs and  is realized at stage  the imputation to player  is . For subgame consistency to be satisfied, the imputation according to the original optimality principle has to be maintained at all the  stages along the cooperative trajectory . Therefore to guarantee subgame consistency, the payment scheme  in (4.2) has to satisfy the conditions
+    (4.3)
for  and . 
	Using (4.3) one can obtain  equals  with probability 1. Crucial to the formulation of a subgame consistent solution is the derivation of a payment scheme , for  , ,  and  so that the imputation in (4.3) can be realized. This will be done in the sequel.
	For notational convenience in deriving such a payment scheme, we denote the vector  by . A theorem deriving a subgame consistent PDP can be established as follows.
Theorem 4.1.
A payment equaling 

               ,            (4.4)
for ,		
given to player  at stage , if  occurs and , would lead to the realization of the imputation in (4.3). 
Proof.  Following (4.3) one can express the term  as

                     +.           (4.5)
Using (4.5), one can obtain
  
         
                 + 
         .     	(4.6)
	Substituting the term   in (4.2) by the last expression in (4.6) yields: 

                  .      	(4.7)
By re-arranging terms in (4.7) one can obtain:

               ,            (4.8)
for  and ;
which is condition in (4.3). Hence Theorem 4.1 follows.                    
	For a given imputation vector 
,  
for  and ,       
Theorem 4.1 can be used to derive the PDP that leads to the realization this vector. 
4.2. Transfer Payments
When all players are using the cooperative strategies, the payoff that player  will directly received at stage  given that   and  occurs becomes  
	.
However, according to the agreed upon imputation, player  is to received  at stage  as given in Theorem 4.1. Therefore a side-payment  
  ,    (4.9)
for   and ,
will be given to player  to yield the cooperative imputation .

5.  Concluding Remarks  
This paper considers subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic dynamic games. This new approach widens the application of cooperative stochastic differential game theory to problems where future environments are not known with certainty.  The extension of the analysis in continuous-time randomly furcating stochastic differential games to an analysis in discrete time is not just of theoretical interest but also for practical reasons in applications. In computer modeling and operations research discrete-time analysis often proved to be more applicable and compatible with actual data. In the process of obtaining the main results for subgame consistent solution, Nash equilibrium for randomly furcating stochastic dynamic games and optimal control for  randomly furcating stochastic dynamic problems are also derived.
The analysis presented can be expanded in a couple of directions. First the random event  may take up more complex processes, like a branching process. 
	Second, the analysis can be readily applied to derive dynamically consistent solutions in randomly-furcating dynamic games in which the random variables  are not present. In particular, the objective that player  seeks to maximize becomes
,    for ,	            (5.1)
subject to the deterministic dynamics:
	.						(5.2)
	Following the analysis in Sections 3 and 4 and the proof of Theorem 4.1, a theorem deriving a subgame consistent PDP for the randomly-furcating dynamic game (6.1)-(6.1) can be established as follows.
Theorem 5.1.
A payment equaling 

               ,            	(6.3)
for ,		
given to player  at stage , if  occurs and , would yield the PDP leading to a subgame consistent solution of the game (6.1)-(6.2).  
Finally, since this is the first time that subgame consistent solution is derived for randomly furcating dynamic games, further research along this line is expected.
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